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TERROR AND THE HYDRA:
REPRESSION AND RESURGENCE
IN THE ARGENTINE WORKING CLASS
James F. Petras
INTRODUCTION
In 1971 in the offices of the Argentine Industrialists Union (UIA), the
organization of the largest industrial firms, I interviewed the head of the
organization. We were discussing the political options most attractive to
Argentine capitalists. When I asked what he thought of the Brazilian model,
he looked ecstatic: "It's an industrialist's paradise." I then asked, "Why not in
Argentina?" His brow furried and he replied in a measured tone: "The
Argentine trade unions are too strong, they would resist, there might be a civil
war and we don't know who would win, how it would come out." Faced with
this uncertainty, he thought, in the circumstances, that it would be best for the
military to return power to the civilian politicians, to defuse the polarization
and tension racking Argentina at the time, and which the military was not in a
position to control. What struck me at the time, but became more apparent in
retrospect, was the fact that the business leaders' hesitation in accepting a
terrorist regime and bloody repression was all contingent on the issue of the
probability of success. There was not a moment's consideration of lives lost or
democratic values, rather there was a fear that if the battle was engaged and
lost, there would be an even greater degree of working class power. The
implication was clear; if a Brazilian solution could be imposed through a
successful civil war against the working class then by all means the big
business community was all for it. Unquestionably what was a central concern
to the most prominent and leading industrialists was the industrial paradise of
Brazil of the late 1960's: no strikes, labor unions controlled by a police state,
social security, and wage cuts imposed by the capitalist class, dismantling of
the state sector, freeing of prices, etc. — the phrase "industrial paradise"
signified the capacity of the industrialists to do whatever they wished without
hindrance from workers' organizations and a

nationalist-populist state. But as the industrialists knew too well there were
formidable obstacles to realizing their Molochian-erotic fantasies: the insurrectionary movements in Cordoba and Rosario, the incendiary uprising in
Tucumán, the total shut-down of the economy resulting from the general
strikes decreed by the C.G.T. Only a regime willing to take the most extreme
measures in the most determined fashion was capable of paving the road to
that "paradise." The industrialists were willing to support such a regime if and
when it would emerge. . . The regime of March 1976 was up to its "historic
task" set forth by the capitalist class — it proceeded to the most radical
transformation of society in modern Argentine history as a means of realizing
the industrialist's paradise. My discussion will focus on the uniqueness of this
terrorist regime and its impact on Argentine society. The scope and depth of
terror practiced by this government is inadequately described by terms such as
"bureaucratic-authoritarian." Rather the scope and depth of repression suggest
something akin to fascist terrorist regimes. My purpose, however, is to
examine the impact of this terror and repression on the Argentine left and to
examine the differential impact which it has had on formal and informal
organization. My thesis is that while the repression has been successful in
decimating the formal organizational apparatus of the 'left,' it has failed to
destroy the informal popular movement. The other unique aspect of the
Argentine situation is the massive resurgence of working class struggle —
despite the fascist terror — on a scale and scope unheard of in any other
country having a similar type of regime. Moreover, this working class resurgence occurs despite the inactivity of formal democratic political institutions, the illegalization of the Trade Unions, the murder, jailing and exile of
practically all the known official leaders, especially those known at the
national or regional level. Finally, the resurgence occurs despite the massive
and continuing purges of grassroots leaders. The issue that I am centrally
concerned with then is where does this "undirected" rank and file resurgence
come from and what sustains it in the absence of official organization and in
the face of an all pervasive terroristic police apparatus.

TERROR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARGENTINA
Though Argentina has been ruled off and on by military dictators since
the 1930's, the military regime of March 1976 represents an entirely new form
of domination, both in terms of the scale, scope and duration of repression.
Never has the Argentine working class been subject to the level of terror and
sustained attack as it has experienced during the Videla regime. The singular
effort by the military, para-military and police forces to abolish all forms of
political opposition has produced an unprecedented level of political

assassinations, jailings and exiles: over 30,000 deaths and disappearances,
thousands of jailings, hundreds of thousands of exiles, tens of thousands of
tortured, mutilated and disfigured. Practically everyone in Argentina has
direct personal ties with at least someone affected by the repression. Moreover, millions of Argentine workers and salaried employees have seen their
political parties, trade unions, community and social service organizations
intervened and/or closed down — thus eliminating all the organizations which
were created over the past 50 years. The regime of 1976 has set in motion
forces and policies which are uprooting institutions and relationships established through the greater part of the 20th century. In that precise historic
context we cannot consider this a "conservative" or "traditional" dictatorship.
Previous dictatorships from the 1930's through the early 1970's
(Aram-buro, Ongania, Lanusse, etc.) were either "caretaker" regimes —
seizing power to displace a populist government and prepare conditions for
the return of a civilian regime — or engaged in haphazard, limited assaults,
selective assassinations and official imprisonment. In contrast, the neo-fascist
regime engages in massive assassination, "disappearances" of political
prisoners by para-military death-squads in a systematic and sustained fashion.
The institutionalization of terror and the permanent purge mark a qualitatively
different form of dictatorship. The needs of large-scale capital for long-term
security and sweeping access to all sectors of the economy confronted the
obstacle of a highly organized working class; the end result was the
long-term, all pervasive police-state.
The central object of the state was the transformation of the major obstacle to capital expansion: the organized class conscious working class. The
major goal of the terror was to transform the working class from an obstacle
to capital accumulation to an instrument. The purpose of the terror was a
sustained effort to systematically abolish the memory of solidarity, the social
bonds within the working class, to atomize the class and inculcate the feelings
of subordination, inferiority and servility characteristic of the pre-Peronist
period: the ideal is to reproduce the docile cabecitas negras found in the past
on the rural estates within the urban working class.
Much of the world's media has focused on the plight of the refugees, the
regime's persecution of the intellectuals and professionals — the killing and
torture of well-known personalities, guerrilla leaders, etc. But as Juan Carlos
Marion has demonstrated, the great bulk of those murdered by the regime
were rank and file workers.1 The regime has launched wholesale attacks on
militants in the factories — whole executive councils of locals have "disappeared" — and local officials: grassroots leaders, shop stewards, class
oriented unionists and rank and file oriented Peronists have all been subject to
one form or another of repression. Every major enterprise which has had
"labor conflict" has been affected; in each case the regime intervenes on

the side of the owners, giving capital absolute control over its labor force.
Never has the capitalist state acted in such an unconditional, unmediated
fashion on behalf of capital.
Thus while the Videla regime represents a unique "break" with Argentina
history, the reemergence of working class struggle on a massive scale in the
face of terror represents a unique break-through for the working class
movement in Latin America. Despite the continuing terror, thousands of
strikes have taken place between November 1978 and January 1980, involving
tens of thousands of workers. The Argentine working class has not been immobilized in the same fashion as has occurred in Chile and Uruguay. The
explanations for this immobilization, which rely on repression, fail to explain
why in Argentina, with similar or greater levels of repression, the struggle has
broken out throughout the country and in a variety of industries and regions.
Moreover, the level of formal organizations of the working class was higher in
Argentina and the subsequent dismantlement of these organizations was
greater — thus leaving few formal institutional forms of expression open.
Finally, through the connivance of the great powers (U.S.A., Russia, China,
etc.), the violations of human rights in Argentina have received far less
attention than, say, Chile, and the struggle has certainly received far less
outside support. The same can be said for the role of the Church, which has
been critical of the regime in Chile but notably acquiescent in Argentina. The
question that is posed is this: given the massive dismemberment of the formal
organization of the working class movement, the lack of international and
internal institutional support, what accounts for the resurgence of working
class mass action?2
THE TWO FACES OF THE ARGENTINE LEFT
I would like to call attention to a fundamental division within the Argentine left that cuts across formal political, trade union and social organizations
and ideology that is essential to understanding the process of class struggle
emerging in the post-1976 period. There are essentially two Argentine 'lefts,'
or popular movements, each with their own distinct political style, social
position and structure. We may refer to one as the "political class" and the
other as the "rank and file." The political class is composed of the leaders and
organizers within the formal organizations, the professional politicians and
trade union bureaucrats, the university intellectuals and professionals, the
spokespeople for the Marxist and nationalist traditions who, in large part
provide the apparatus for the formal organizations and formulate the program
for political action at the national level. The political class has been in charge
of organizing the general strikes, the election campaigns, the public
demonstrations, the guerrilla raids, the signing of collective agreements, the

publication of journals, manifestos, etc. The political class has also received
almost all the attention of the political and social analysts. When writing
about the Argentine popular movement, most of the writing refers to the
activities and policies of this group and the reactions of the rank and file to
the activities organized by the formal organizations.
These analyses seem to me to be shortsighted and to overlook the fact
that the "rank and file" working class have their own social, political, familial
networks around which they organize a good part of their life; that these
relations, activities, values and social position are distinct from those of the
political class even as they share with the "political class" common organizational membership (though different positions in the organization), common electoral behavior and common opposition to the military, ruling class,
etc. However, there is a common sub-culture that unites the working class
independently of the formal organization which embraces kinship, neighborhood, workplace and social clubs. The common experiences shared within
these settings sets off the working class from the political class. The differences manifest themselves in some cases in different forms of verbal expression, but most fundamentally in the notion of compañerismo
(comradship) that comes from sharing the day to day hardships, social events,
tragedies, sporting events. Moreover, there is even a "racial component" as
the rank and file tend to be a "cabecita negras," while the political class is
largely drawn from the "European" background.
In practice, in the pre-1976 period, the two levels, the political class and
the rank and file, interacted in general strikes, demonstrations, elections, etc.,
but not on a day to day basis. There was a separation of class, life style and
language. Thus there are two sets of class bonds that involve the working
class: the vertical bonds manifested in their membership and activity in the
impersonal national organization (Peronist movement, CGT, etc.), linking
together the working class on a national level for political struggle; and the
horizontal bonds found in the face to face relations in the neighborhood and
workplace where the struggle is over immediate issues. This distinction
within the Argentine popular movement between the "political class" and the
"rank and file" is crucial to understanding how and why the Argentine
working class struggle continues despite the savage repression of the formal
organizations and the all pervasive activities of the secret police and the
terroristic para-military forces. The capacity of the Argentine working class
to sustain collective struggle for class demands is rooted in the distinctive
features of the Argentine working class, features found in few other workers'
movements in the world in the same degree.

DISTINCT FEATURES OF THE ARGENTINE WORKING CLASS
The most striking feature of the Argentine working class is the extraordinary degree of class solidarity and organization. This is manifested in its
unique capacity to successfully execute massive general strikes on a nationwide basis with maximum success. I know of no country in the world where
repeated general strikes of 24, 48 and 72 hours were called and supported by
the entire class voluntarily, that is, with no effort to "coerce" the different
class member into participation. Moreover, numerous strikes were called in
the middle of workdays — say at 10 a.m. — and in impressive displays of
class solidarity hundreds of thousands of workers "down their tools" in the
presence of employers and, at times, in the face of military mobilizations. In
1971,1 witnessed a massive walk-out of workers from an auto-plant, part of a
general strike, in which the workers had to walk through a cordon of heavily
armed troops. Not one worker remained in the plant. The class solidarity
extended to other strata also, involving small business people, teachers, social
workers, etc. I recall in Córdoba having my shoes shined when the whistle
went off signalling the beginning of a general strike and the bootblack stopped
working, leaving one shoe unpolished. When the strike was called even the
streetwalkers disappeared.
The second feature of the Argentine working class was a general
rejection of the state and ruling class domination and values. This is not to say
that the workers did not demand services from the state, did not participate in
national pastimes (soccer-matches), etc., but rather brought its own set of
values and interests into play while engaging the adversary. Thus in extracting
benefits from the state, the workers did not respond with "gratitude" but as
something to which they were entitled and indeed must receive. The
bourgeoisie was sick to death of this "prepotencia de clase" as it characterized
the self-affirmation of the working class. Even when workers participated in
'national events,' such as soccer matches, which supposedly bring all classes
together — the seating arrangements and form of involvement reflects class
differences. Moreover, the "national unity" is rather a surface phenomenon.
During the Copa Hemispheric that I witnessed in 1971 in Buenos Aires, a
disputed play penalizing the Argentine team led to massive chants of
"Argentina" — till the police came onto the field and pointed their riot guns at
the vocal, but peaceful, galleries made up overwhelmingly of workers.
Immediately the chant changed to asesinos, while the bourgeois Argentines
occupying reserved and box seats were silent. The presence of state
authorities clearly evoked the underlying class hostilities of the working class,
even in this mixed cultural setting.
On a more general level, the notion of class interest is manifested in the
intransigent insistence of the working class to not sacrifice their standard of

living for an illusory "national development" — capitalist accumulation. The
level of mystification in this sense is very low. Even Perón was completely
incapable of imposing any sacrifice of working class interests in the name of
national capitalist growth. On the contrary, Peron's influence was totally
dependent on his capacity to secure benefits for the working class and failing
that his influences began to ebb. From this vantage point, working class
support for Peronist politics was less a product of mystification and more the
expression of the search for instrumental goals.
The fourth feature of the Argentine working class was powerful informal
bonds, expressed through family, neighborhood and workplace that reinforced
class bonds and links among the working class and against the ruling class.
Family and kinship ties have frequently been described as "conservative"
forces, limiting class consciousness, etc. This approach assumes what it needs
to prove — that the family and kinship groups themselves contain and transmit alien conservative values. In the Argentine case, at least two generations
(1940-1950 and 1960-1970) shared common experiences of class struggle and
organization. They shared membership in the same class anchored social
clubs, trade unions, asados (cook-outs), and therefore the primary group
orientation reinforced class ties. Likewise, working and living place associations have been described as inculcating 'parochial,' 'local' outlooks which
are supposedly incompatible with class consciousness. Once again, the argument assumes that the content of the local involvement is diffuse or devoid of
class content — which is precisely not the point: the neighborhoods and
workplaces in Argentina are preeminently class homogeneous, at least to the
degree of containing predominantly working and lower salaried employees
and petty vendors. The heavy arms and large contingents of police forces that
were mobilized to make arrests in working class neighborhoods attests to the
fear that state authorities had of neighborhood reactions. Likewise, most kidnappings of workers took place after working hours to avoid the collective
wrath at the place of employment.
The fifth feature of the Argentine working class was the high levels of
trust, confidence and mutual support within local working class communities.
This factor is crucial in understanding why the secret police has been
hardpressed to break locally organized strikes and protests. It is extremely
difficult to crack the tight family, kinship and neighborhood ties. For a worker
to become a police informer would not only label him a traitor to an "abstract" class but an enemy to his most basic and personal relations. It would
lead to total ostracism from life-long companions, friends and, most important
family members. The primary ties provide a security for local class organizations and activists that no formal organization can match and to which
no police or par-military organization has been able to destroy. Within these
networks all the prohibited activities take place — and the word hardly ever

leaks out. I recall viewing a prohibited Pro-Peronist film during the Lanusse
period "Ni Vencidos ni Vencedores"in a Rosario working class house with 30
or 40 other people — essentially 3 or 4 families, including grandparents, parents and children without any sense of a security problem. Contrary to more
conventional social scientists who speak of a "non-participatory," "alienated"
or "non-integrated" working class I find a high degree of integration in
working class sub-culture which coincides with a rejection or non-participation in the dominant or oppressor culture promoted by the ruling class. The
working class participated in formal political and social organization of the
class but also maintained its class autonomy exercised through its informal
local organizational ties.
STA TE REPRESSION: IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CLASS AND
THE RANK AND FILE
My central point is that state repression has had a differential effect on
the "two faces" of the Argentine left. Essentially it was most successful in
undermining the formally organized popular movement and least successful in
destroying the rank and file basis of struggle — even though the brunt of the
repression has been borne by the latter.
The political class has suffered massive destruction. Among the hundreds
of thousands of Argentines in the diaspora are many of the intellectual,
political and trade union leaders of the popular movement. The exiles are the
relatively more fortunate victims — as the terror has taken a massive toll of
victims through innumerable kidnappings and "disappearances." For those
few political intellectuals and party people who have remained in Argentina
and are not incarcerated, fear has largely paralyzed their public life: the main
pre-occupation is survival.
Along with the physical decimation of the activist core, the terrorist
regime has gone about systematically dismantling the trade union organizations intervening the universities and proscribing political parties —
destroying all forms of autonomous political and social organization. The end
result is that what is left of the formal organization is largely an empty and
impotent husk, tightly controlled or totally destroyed by the regime. The
traditional political leaders hover together, petitioning and protesting but
incapable of defining any new political initiatives or mobilizing any significant popular support. For all intents and purposes the political class has
been incapacitated.

REPRESSION AND THE RANK AND FILE
The regime did not confine itself to merely intervening at the apex of the
hierarchical order of the political movement but aimed its principal blows at
the middle and lower ranks among the militants of the popular movement:
more than any other regime in Argentine history it acted to uproot the mass
movement by a frontal assault on the main forces linked to the great mass of
the wage labor force: the factory militants, the shop stewards, the local union
leaders. The Videla dictatorship (unlike previous traditional leaders) did not
believe that a "handful of foreign inspired agitators" were stirring up the
otherwise complacent working class — nor did they act on that assumption.
The dictatorship knew and acted on the assumption that the whole organized
conscious working class was "responsible," for the strikes, wage demands and
constraints on capital and therefore it extended a policy that would directly
affect the class as a whole: mass terror without constraints against all working
class militants, with or without Marxist, Peronist or syndicalist affiliations.
For a brief conjuncture this massive bloody purge did arrest and perhaps
intimidate the working class (April 7, 1976 till October 1978). Many of the
known local militants and political cadres were wiped out. The disarticulation
of the national networks and formal political structures did temporarily
disorient the working class. The result however was not permanent
atomiza-tion or massive paralysis as the regime had hoped, but a turning
inward — the working class turned to the most elementary and secure forms
or organization and struggle: to local activity organized around particular
industries, factories or neighborhoods; to limited demands for immediate
needs (wage increases). From within each locale new anonymous leaders
emerged, collective spokespersons who negotiated contracts over the phone
— the rank and file developed created forms of action to secure demands and
avoid assassination. Local organizations were reconstituted based on primary
and secondary groups — loyalties of kinship and friendship reinforced class
ties and ensured security against the terrorist state. By September 1979 a
whole wave of strikes had broken out throughout the metalurgical, transport
and other industries. Hundreds of strikes in large and small plants became
everyday occurence. This massive upsurge occurred despite the continuing
terror and in the absence of the formal trade union party and intellectual
leadership. This resurgence of rank and file action can only be explained by
the durability of the underlying class bonds located in the family,
neighborhood and factory, reinforced by the popular culture and provoked by
the severe decline in standard of living. Explanations that resort to
"spontaneity" refuse to look behind the existence of formal organization. The
autonomous working class rank and file of Argentine industrial capitalism
activate themselves and sustain activity through long standing association in
informal settings and

groupings. This informal Argentine left is today the most vital force in
society. Yet it is the least discussed and understood since communication and
interaction is largely within the working class and few intellectuals, foreign or
Argentine have any substantial relationship with it. Indeed for too many years
most intellectuals measured class consciousness among workers through
questionnaires that evaluated verbal responses in terms of scales derived from
abstract ideology. The conclusions usually found an ambiguity or low level of
class consciousness — that was incomprehensible in terms of the actual levels
of struggle. The high level of class consciousness of the Argentine working
class was and is manifested through participation in collective class activity,
and in the day to day inter-action in places and events which have a specific
class character.
In summary, then, despite the massive repression and physical destruction of thousands of local leaders, the Argentine working class has generated
new leaders, organizers and direct action because the neighborhood, the family and the rank and file in the factories have within themselves the capacity to
reproduce themselves. Like Hydra, every time the regime cuts off one head,
two take its place.

NOTAS
1. Juan Carlos Marín, Argentina 1973-1976: La Democracia, esa superstición y los hechos armados (cela, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales,
Uruguay.)
2. There are two qualifications that should be stated: mass workers'
action is usually plant, or at most, industry based and focused on immediate
economic actions. Without formal organization, it is hard to visualize how
national-political struggles could successfully be organized. Within the
limitations of locally anchored, economically motivated actions, however,
exist the embryos of a new national working class organization. As we shall
discuss later, the units and basis of class action, family, etc., shape the form of
action.

